Jeffrey Bennett's QJS piece on the dialectical relationship between 'passing' (lying about sexual orientation at blood donation centers) and protesting (refusing to lie about one's sexual orientation, and hence, being deferred from donation) amongst queer men in the US gives us an interesting insight on resistance. Bennett believes that protesting at the site of donation makes the state question how effective it's policy really is, because it makes the state wonder just how many queer men lie about their sexual orientation and donate anyway(motivated either by their desire to make a political statement, or their desire to be 'counted' as citizens, or both). Further, 'passing', or lying about one's sexual orientation, and allowing 'tainted' blood into the system is what makes the protest more effective. Further, it also broadens our understanding of resistance, as not merely that which is an 'active expression'.
Having established Bennett's thesis, I now want to consider Bennett's definition of 'passing'. He calls it the ability of a member of a disenfranchised group to render invisible those traits used to oppress them culturally and institutionally. Further, he says, "Having eluded aspects of gender, race, class or sexual orientation, people can paradoxically live their lives more openly." This point, this unassuming little slip is where I feel Bennett's assessment falls short of a (Capital-C) Critical piece. I am going to offer two hypothesis here that I believe disrupt Bennett's argument.
1. Eluding aspects of gender, race and class, or even sexual orientation is fundamentally premised on a particular conception of public space. Outside this particular conception, this is not always possible. Tropes of 'citizenship' are what Bennett hinges on, the blood ban disallows the queer body to construct itself as a 'citizen'. Citizenship, as it is offered in this piece, is a construct that is firmly located within the American model of democracy. Regarding protest as something that makes you MORE of a civilian subject is an unquestioned assumption here. It is only within this narrow, circumscribed scenario that this argument works. Further, and this is what is MOST PROBLEMATIC for me, it is only within such a notion of the 'public sphere', (a Habermasean conception), where one can use one's 'fragmented' identity towards AND against the body politic. I believe that it is only within a techno-modern public sphere mediated by networks of electronic communication and transportation that such 'passing' can take place.
What do I mean? The 'queer' male identity is one that is not defined by any physical identity markers. The marginalization of queerness based on being 'marked out' cannot be equated to racial, class, or gender traits. Situations where one can render one's gender, race, and class invisible ONLY occur within a 'postmodern', post-industrial context wherein one can rely on other 'traits' (for a queer man donating, this can be his 'masculinity', his 'American-ness', and historically, his 'whiteness') to be included. Using the same example of blood donation, let's take another example. What does a Chinese gay immigrant do to 'pass' the system? How does he pass inscriptions of identity on his body? Even in a 'heterosexual' scenario, what do I do when I am told that I cannot donate blood on our campus, because I am from a country in which malaria still exists? Could I claim to be 'American'?
There are bodies that the states oppresses more brutally than the others. Devices differ for different bodies. Amitava Kumar, in his book 'Passport Photos', talks about how every book is a passport, and every PASSPORT is a BOOK'. It is political knowledge; a knowledge that helps to contain; a knowledge that allows for violence on the [immigrant] body.
2. My second hypothesis attacks the question of 'discursive violence', that Bennett claims is done to queer male bodies. In the case of HIV/AIDS, I'm afraid that discursive violence cannot be equated to the MATERIAL violence that is operated on docile bodies. The queer male identity is one of MATERIAL privilege; and this is a fact that we are too often apt to forget. In Basu & Dutta, in Dutta's (2008, 2006) other work, and in the work of others like Paul Farmer, we see that the violence of identity politics and HIV is not at all discursive; it's material. It is related to poverty, access to basic medical facilities, access to the bare essentials of life. These ritual paeans of the 'discursive' violence obscures the material violence of identity. That is something that any theory of emancipation cannot ignore.
Bennett writes eloquently, and makes for great reading and reflection. However, this is not what the critical project is about. This piece, inasmuch as it reveals the disciplining nature of knowledge and the dialectic nature of active and subversive resistance, also obscures the more fundamental questions of material violence.
Having established Bennett's thesis, I now want to consider Bennett's definition of 'passing'. He calls it the ability of a member of a disenfranchised group to render invisible those traits used to oppress them culturally and institutionally. Further, he says, "Having eluded aspects of gender, race, class or sexual orientation, people can paradoxically live their lives more openly." This point, this unassuming little slip is where I feel Bennett's assessment falls short of a (Capital-C) Critical piece. I am going to offer two hypothesis here that I believe disrupt Bennett's argument.
1. Eluding aspects of gender, race and class, or even sexual orientation is fundamentally premised on a particular conception of public space. Outside this particular conception, this is not always possible. Tropes of 'citizenship' are what Bennett hinges on, the blood ban disallows the queer body to construct itself as a 'citizen'. Citizenship, as it is offered in this piece, is a construct that is firmly located within the American model of democracy. Regarding protest as something that makes you MORE of a civilian subject is an unquestioned assumption here. It is only within this narrow, circumscribed scenario that this argument works. Further, and this is what is MOST PROBLEMATIC for me, it is only within such a notion of the 'public sphere', (a Habermasean conception), where one can use one's 'fragmented' identity towards AND against the body politic. I believe that it is only within a techno-modern public sphere mediated by networks of electronic communication and transportation that such 'passing' can take place.
What do I mean? The 'queer' male identity is one that is not defined by any physical identity markers. The marginalization of queerness based on being 'marked out' cannot be equated to racial, class, or gender traits. Situations where one can render one's gender, race, and class invisible ONLY occur within a 'postmodern', post-industrial context wherein one can rely on other 'traits' (for a queer man donating, this can be his 'masculinity', his 'American-ness', and historically, his 'whiteness') to be included. Using the same example of blood donation, let's take another example. What does a Chinese gay immigrant do to 'pass' the system? How does he pass inscriptions of identity on his body? Even in a 'heterosexual' scenario, what do I do when I am told that I cannot donate blood on our campus, because I am from a country in which malaria still exists? Could I claim to be 'American'?
There are bodies that the states oppresses more brutally than the others. Devices differ for different bodies. Amitava Kumar, in his book 'Passport Photos', talks about how every book is a passport, and every PASSPORT is a BOOK'. It is political knowledge; a knowledge that helps to contain; a knowledge that allows for violence on the [immigrant] body.
2. My second hypothesis attacks the question of 'discursive violence', that Bennett claims is done to queer male bodies. In the case of HIV/AIDS, I'm afraid that discursive violence cannot be equated to the MATERIAL violence that is operated on docile bodies. The queer male identity is one of MATERIAL privilege; and this is a fact that we are too often apt to forget. In Basu & Dutta, in Dutta's (2008, 2006) other work, and in the work of others like Paul Farmer, we see that the violence of identity politics and HIV is not at all discursive; it's material. It is related to poverty, access to basic medical facilities, access to the bare essentials of life. These ritual paeans of the 'discursive' violence obscures the material violence of identity. That is something that any theory of emancipation cannot ignore.
Bennett writes eloquently, and makes for great reading and reflection. However, this is not what the critical project is about. This piece, inasmuch as it reveals the disciplining nature of knowledge and the dialectic nature of active and subversive resistance, also obscures the more fundamental questions of material violence.
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